The Logic of ‘Being Informed’ Revisited and Revised

Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

Abstract

The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.

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Noisy vs Merely Equivocal Logics

Paper based on Paraconsistency and the Logic of Ambiguous Connectives

Abstract

Substructural pluralism about the meaning of logical connectives is best understood as the view that natural language connectives have all (and only) the properties conferred by classical logic, but that particular occurrences of these connectives cannot simultaneously exhibit all these properties. This is just a more sophisticated way of saying that while natural language connectives are ambiguous, they are not so in the way classical logic intends them to be. Since this view is usually framed as a means to resolve paradoxes, little attention is paid to the logical properties of the ambiguous connectives themselves. The present paper sets out to Þll this gap by arguing that substructural logicians should care about these connectives, by describing a consequence relation between a set of ambiguous premises and an ambiguous conclusion, and finally by exhaustively characterising the logical properties of ambiguous connectives.

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Understanding Logical Epistemology

Presented at CAP in Europe 2009 (Barcelona, Spain)

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to lay the foundation for a broader meta-theoretical reflection on the practice of the formal modeling of cognitive states and actions. Two examples, one from basic epistemic logic, the other from dynamic epistemic logic are used to illustrate some wellknown challenges. These are further evaluated by means of two oppositions: the contrast between abstraction and idealization and the difference between a properties of the agent reading versus a properties of the model reading. To conclude, some methodological insights inherited from the philosophy of information are proposed as fruitful way of understanding the formal modeling of cognitive states and actions.

ECAP'09 — Philosophy of Information and Information Technology

The philosophy of information and information technology track is part of the ECAP '09 conference.

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Adaptive Logic as Conditional Belief

This paper supersedes Logic in Epistemic Perspective. Adaptive Logic as Conditional Belief.

Abstract

In this paper we reconstruct the Þnal derivability relation of adaptive logic within the framework of conditional doxastic logic (CDL). On the formal level, this is achieved by generalising the preference ordering used in CDL in such a way that it can capture the preferential semantics of adaptive logic. The final result is a class of preferential models wherein a boxed formula is valid iff a corresponding formula can be finally derived using a particular adaptive strategy.

Presently being revised.

Reasoning about Data and Information. Abstraction between states and commodities

Paper based on A two-level approach to logics of data and information

Published in Synthese 167(2) (2009): 231-249.

(Knowledge, Rationality, and Action) special issue on the Philosophy of Information and Logic edited by Luciano Floridi and Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson (Online First).

Abstract

Cognitive states as well as cognitive commodities play central though distinct roles in our epistemological theories. By being attentive to how a difference in their roles affects our way of referring to them, we can undoubtedly accrue our understanding of the structure and functioning of our main epistemological theories. In this paper we propose an analysis of the dichotomy between states and commodities in terms of the method of abstraction, and more specifically by means of infomorphisms between different ways to classify states of information, information-bases, and evidential situations.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9407-6

Some Epistemic Modalities Derived from Adaptive Logic

Talk given at the VAF Conference 2009 (Tilburg).

Abstract

When reformulated as a modal logic for conditional belief, the main properties of adaptive logics can be captured as properties of the resulting modal operators. The purpose of the present paper is to give a broadly epistemic interpretation to these modalities, and use these to bring out the distinctive epistemic character of adaptive logics. Concretely, I want to do three things: (a) give a brief description of a modal logic for conditional belief based on the semantics of adaptive consequence; (b) investigate the role of logical and epistemic or doxastic possibilities in this logic; and (c) show how these modalities can be used to elucidate the relevance of logic for deductive reasoning.

A Logic of Ambiguous Connectives: Discrimination vs Disagreement

Talk given at the Foundations of Logical Consequence Workshop I: Proof-Theoretic vs Model-Theoretic Semantics.

(Arché Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology, University of Saint Andrews.)

Review of “Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”

Review of: “Mainstream and Formal Epistemology” (Vincent Hendricks)

Published in Erkenntnis 69(3) (2008): 427-432.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1

Paraconsistency and the Logic of Ambiguous Connectives

Talk given at the Fourth World Congress of Paraconsistency (Melbourne)

Abstract

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Logic in Epistemic Perspective. Adaptive Consequence as Conditional Belief

Paper based on Adaptive Logics presented in ‘almost Amsterdam style’: an outline and an application.

Abstract

In this paper we reconstruct the Þnal derivability relation of adaptive logic (a peculiar kind of nonmonotonic logic developed with the intent to formalise and explicate real-life reasoning) within the framework of modal epistemic logic. On the formal level, this is achieved through the adoption of (i) a modal language with operators labelled with sets of non-modal formulae, and (ii) a model theory which evaluates modal formulae over a contextually restricted range of possible worlds.

Adaptive Logics presented in ‘almost Amsterdam style’: an outline and an application

Talk given at Logics for Dynamics of Information and Preferences Working sessions

(ILLC, Amsterdam)

Abstract

Adaptive logics (a family of nonmonotonic logics introduced by Batens, and further developed by his co-workers) are often suggestively described as "logics which adapt themselves to the specific premise-sets they are applied to." Therefore, their functioning is fleshed out in terms of a dynamic proof-theory which allows for defeasible inference-steps. Notwithstanding the fact that this is an accurate description of what adaptive logics do, this is not always the best way to introduce them. The obvious alternative is to explain some of the basic insights of adaptive logics in terms of its preferential semantics. Admittedly, this is not the adaptive logician's preferred starting point (for it is all about the dynamic proof-theory), but from a present-day semantical perspective on logical dynamics it is undoubtedly the most familiar one.

In this presentation I want to do two things. First, and most importantly, to reformulate the model-theory of adaptive logics in a modal-epistemic framework. This move requires us to interpret the preferential semantics relative to a box-operator with a contextually restricted range. Secondly, and largely as an illustration of the former, to describe how this framework can be applied to elucidate how information loss due to equivocal communication could be reduced.

Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information

Published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic 36(6) (2007): 659-94.

Abstract

Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from J.C. Beall and Greg Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9054-2

Informational content and information structures: a pluralist approach

Invited tutorial given at the ILCLI International Workshop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action

Abstract

The tutorial connects two notions of information: the inverse relationship principle which relates informational content to the exclusion of possibilities, and information-structures based on a partial ordering on states of information. Jointly, these allow the formulation of several distinct precise notions of content-individuation.

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LogKCA-07

ILCLI International Workshop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action

A two-level approach to logics of data and information

Presented at the First Workshop on the Philosophy of Information and Logic (Oxford, UK)

Abstract

Cognitive states like knowledge and belief, as well as cognitive commodities like evidence, justification, or proof play a central role in our epistemological theories. Being attentive to the way such states and commodities interact in these theories is particularly important. This is even more so if, besides knowledge, we also want to reason about how data and information improve our overall epistemic position. This is mainly due to the fact that being informed is itself ambiguous between the predominantly syntactic relation of holding a piece of data that qualifies as genuine information and the largely semantic relation of being in a state which satisfies certain conditions. In this paper we argue that getting the relation between states and commodities “right” is a first prerequisite for the choice of bridge axioms in a combined logic of data and information with theoretical virtues similar to the existing combined logics of knowledge and belief. To start with, we formalise the intuitively valid principles that “being informed involves holding data,” and “being informed involves holding a piece of information.” Subsequently, we check how these necessary conditions for being informed constrain the set of plausible bridge axioms, and then outline a generic combined system. To conclude, a number of broader methodological considerations are introduced and related to the specificity of introducing informational considerations into the practice of formal modelling.

Noise, Equivocation, and Informational Content

Presented at North American Conference on Philosophy and Computing (Loyola University, Chicago, US)

Abstract

The present paper expands upon the previously defended thesis of informational pluralism. This is the view that the content conveyed by a message is a function of the level of abstraction at which the relevant communication is modelled. Specifically, it focuses on the problem of how content and presumed content should be evaluated in settings where the communication is equivocal.

The formal approach is a defeasible account of perceived content. Its functioning is studied informally in terms of the relevant levels of abstraction and the relation of simulation between those levels, and formally characterised in terms of informorphisms between classifications.

Formalising the “No Information Without Data-Representation” Principle

Presented at CAP in Europe 2007 (Twente, The Netherlands)

Published in Waelbers, Briggle & Brey (eds.), Current Issues in Computing and Philosophy, IOS Press.

Abstract

One of the basic principles of the general definition of information is its rejection of dataless information, which is reflected in its endorsement of an ontological neutrality. In general, this principles states that “there can be no information without physical implementation” (Floridi (2005)). Though this is standardly considered a commonsensical assumption, many questions arise with regard to its generalised application. In this paper a combined logic for data and information is elaborated, and specifically used to investigate the consequences of restricted and unrestricted data-implementation-principles.

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ECAP'07 — Philosophy of Information and Information Technology

The philosophy of information and information technology track is part of the ECAP '07 conference.

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Adaptive Conditions for Being Informed

Poster presented at the Formal Epistemology Workshop (CMU, Pittsburgh, US)

Abstract

One of the central aims of the philosophy of information is the formulation of an epistemological theory that is based on information. On this account—and unlike Dretske’s seminal proposal—knowledge should no longer be analysed in terms of beliefs, but directly in terms of the non-doxastic factive attitude of ‘being informed’. A distinctive feature of this project is its simultaneaous investigation of information as a commodity, and the statal conditions that are necessarry and sufficient for being in a state wherein one is informed. While research on the former aspect has essentially been concerned with the veridical nature of semantic information, the research on the latter has, among others, lead to the formulation of an epistemic logic for ‘being informed’.

After a brief elaboration on the discrepancy between reductive analyses of information as a commodity (information as veridical and meaningfull well-formed data) as opposed to the alleged primeness of the statal condition for being informed, we propose a formal analysis of a small class of necessary conditions for being informed. The formulation of these conditions elaborates on previous work on the semantics for the modal logic for ‘being informed’, and uses the preferential models of adaptive logic.

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On Logics and Being Informative. Pluralism, Locality, and Feasibility.

Doctoral thesis defended on the 25th of April 2007.

Abstract

The core topic of this thesis lies within a newly emerged field called the philosophy of information (henceforth, PI), a domain which among others focuses on the diversity of informational phenomena and the sciences of information. We investigate the notions of informativeness and informational content with a non-aprioristic attitude derived from the thesis of logical pluralism and the methodology of the philosophy of information. The formal tools used for that task are mainly those provided by non-classical logics. In a more general perspective, the obtained results shed a light on the actual and potential interaction between cognitive information, formal logic, and the general adherence to formal methods within the philosophy of information.

The central goal is to formulate and to defend a broadly pluralist understanding of the notions of informativity and informational content. The general structure comprises two chapters that contain most of the preliminary work, and three chapters devoted to the formulation of a pluralist alternative to the received view that is of predominantly monist inspiration. Essentially, the preliminary work is concerned with a general account of informativity, and with the thesis of logical pluralism. The alternative proposal starts with a pluralist interpretation of objective content, and continues with a nonmonotonic interpretation of perceived content. The latter alternative is then further motivated in terms of the adaptive or nonmonotonic conditions that characterise states of information from an internal perspective. These adaptive conditions are described in the final chapter.

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Local Information and Adaptive Consequence

Published in Logique et Analyse 49(196) (2006): 461—488.

Special issue on Logic and the Philosophy of Information.

Abstract

In this paper we aim at providing a formal description of what it means to be in a local or partial information-state. Starting from the notion of locality in a relational structure, we define so-called adaptive generated-submodels. The latter are then shown to yield an adaptive consequence relation such that the derivability of []p is naturally interpreted as a core property of being in a state in which one holds the information that p.

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Logic and the Philosophy of Information

Special Issue of Logique & Analyse edited by Luciano Floridi & Patrick Allo

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Review of “Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert Simon”

Review of: Models of a Man: Essays in Memory of Herbert Simon (Augier & March, eds.)

Published in Minds & Machines, 16(2) (2006): 221—224.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-006-9026-2

On When a Disjunction is Informative: Ambiguous Connectives and Pluralism

Presented at (Anti-)Realisms, Logic and Metaphysics (Nancy, France)

Abstract

Present paper’s aim is to put the notion of ambiguous connectives, as explored in Paoli (2003, 2005), in an informational perspective. That is, starting from the notions of informational content and logical pluralism, we ask what it means for a disjunction, i.e. a message of the form “f or y”, to be informative. The bottom line of this paper is that being a pluralist about informational content can even be defended against those who hold a realist conception of semantic information.

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Semantic Information and Logical Orthodoxy: The Case of Contradictions

Presented at CAP in Europe 2006 Conference (Trondheim, Norway)

Abstract

Holding on to the view that Logical Orthodoxy is at best a fallible guide for the formalisation of the concept of semantic information, the inclusion of any logical principle within a logic of information should be the object of closer scrutiny. By investigating the possibility of being informed of a (true) contradiction, this paper adopts the opposite strategy.

Following this unusual method, it is subsequently argued that paraconsistency alone is not enough to motivate the acceptance of some contradictions as genuine information; that accepting contradictory but not veridical information is a rather trivial position; and that only a few motivations for dialetheic (i.e. true contradictory) information stand up to the standards of a theory of semantic information.

Mark Bernstein on 'Software Aesthetics'

Logisch Pluralisme en Informatie (in Dutch)

Presented at 27ste Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag, Rotterdam.

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The Locality of Adaptive Consequence: Adaptive Generated Submodels and Its Labelled Proof-System

In this paper we investigate a refinement of minimal abnormal and reliable models in modal adaptive logics. Starting from lower limit logics below S5, we introduce a new flavour of localised adaptive consequence based on minimally abnormal or reliable point generated submodels. The design of a proof-system for such a localised consequence, asks for a labelling mechanism allowing the derivation of formulas at a point in a frame. A labelled dynamic proof-format is therefore elaborated in the second part of the paper.

Formalising Semantic Information. Lessons from Logical Pluralism

Presented at CAP in Europe 2005 Conference (Västerås, Sweden)

To Appear in Computing, Philosophy, and Cognitive, Science, G. Dodig Crnkovic and S. Stuart (eds.), Cambridge Scholars Press.

Abstract

By introducing the notion of logical pluralism, it can be concluded that up to now theories of semantic information have - at least implicitly - relied on logical monism, the view that there is one true logic. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we ought to ask whether logical pluralism could entail informational pluralism. The basic insights from logical pluralism and their implications for a theory of semantic information should therefore be explored.

First, it is shown that (i) the general definition of semantic information as meaningful well-formed data does not favour any logical system, (ii) there are nevertheless good reasons to prefer a given logic above some others, and (iii) preferring a given logic does not contradict logical pluralism.

A genuine informational pluralism is then outlined by arguing that for every true logic the logical pluralist accepts, a corresponding notion of semantic information arises. Relying on connections between these logics, it can be concluded that different logics yield complementary formalisations of information and informational content. The resulting framework can be considered as a more versatile approach to information than its monist counterparts.

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Being Informative - Information as Information Handling

Presented at Second International Workshop on Philosophy and Informatics (Kaiserslautern)

Published in: WM2005: Professional Knowledge Management Experiences and Visions, edited by Klaus-Dieter Althoff, Andreas Dengel, Ralph Bergmann, Markus Nick and Thomas Roth-Berghofer, 579-86. Kaiserslautern: DFKI Gmbh, 2005.

Also available in CEUR Online Proceedings Vol. 130

Abstract

The core aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the benefits of a formal approach to information as being informative. It is argued that handling information-like objects can be seen as more fundamental than the notion of information itself. Starting from theories of semantic information, it is shown that these leave being informative out of the picture by choosing a logical framework which is essentially classical. Based on arguments in favour of logical pluralism, a formal approach of information handling inspired by non-classical logics is outlined.

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Labelling in Modal Adaptive Logics. An Example

Presented at 1st World Conference and School on Universal Logic (Montreux)

Abstract

Through their development, adaptive logics (see [1]) have often been devised as modal adaptive logics. That is, a modal logic L strengthened with the provisional application of a rule which is not in L itself (e.g.: <>A => [ ]A). Logical systems using such an approach include inconsistency-adaptive logics based on Jaskowski’s non-adjunctive approach [6], and logics for

compatibility [2]. While non-modal adaptive logics generally succeed in providing a natural reconstruction of reasoning, proof-formats for modal adaptive logics lack the same intuitiveness. Basically the drawbacks of the proof-formats stem from adaptive logics’ reliance on a purely syntactic use of modal logics, thus leaving some natural (semantic) insights in modal languages aside. Compared to other adaptive logics (essentially the original inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1) part of the appealing naturalness of dynamic proofs is lost (partly because the rules are defined indirectly with respect to the existence of a Hilbert-style proof). The main purpose of this paper is to provide a labelled proof-format for modal adaptive logics which does not suffer from the mentioned drawbacks.

Thought Experiments, Science Fiction, and the Philosophy of Information

Presented at Thought Experiments Rethought Congress (Ghent, Belgium)

Abstract

In this paper I try to give an alternative account of what (Floridi, 2003) describes as the two approaches to the Philosophy of Information (henceforth PI), and more precisely as the move from an analytical to a constructionist approach within PI. Whereas he tackles the problem from the standpoint of the historical evolution of PI (see: Floridi, 2002) - more generally relying on the notion of a pragmatic turn within contemporary analytical philosophy - I present a rather different approach, which is based on an interpretation of science fiction as a thought experiment.

A Modal Perspective on Proof-Dynamics

Presented at CAP in Europe 2004 Conference (Pavia, Italy)

Published in Computing, Philosophy, and Cognition. L. Magnani and R. Dossena (eds.). London, College Publications: 313—327.

Abstract

Core aim of this paper is to focus on the dynamics of real proofs by introducing the block-semantics from (Batens, 1995) as a dynamical counterpart for classical semantics. We first look briefly at its original formulation - with respect to natural deduction proofs - and then extend its use to tableau-proofs. This yields a perspective on proof-dynamics that (i) explains proofs as a series of steps providing us with an insight in the premises, and (ii) reveals an informational dynamics in proofs unknown to most dynamical logical systems. As the latter remark especially applies to Amsterdam-style dynamic epistemic logic, we consider a weak modal epistemic logic and combine it with dynamic modal operators expressing the informational proof-dynamics (as a natural companion for the informational dynamics due to new information known from dynamic epistemic logic).

The motivation for this approach is twofold. In a general way it is considered as (a first step in) the reconstruction of the proof-dynamics known from adaptive logics (revealed by its block-formulation) within a modal framework (i.e. using a relational structure); in a more restricted way it aims at the explicit application of some results on omniscience formulated in Batens' paper on block-semantics.

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Structured Proofs and Adaptive Logic

Presented at VlaPoLo9 Workshop (Ghent, Belgium)

Processen, Veranderingen en Interacties in Computerwetenschappen En Quantumfysica.

Review of the SLI-2003 Workshop, Brussels, 31st of March 2003.

Published in: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 95, no. 3 (2003): 225.

An Adaptive Logic for Presumptive Truth

Presented at VlaPoLo7 Workshop (Brussels, Belgium)

Abstract

Problem solving in the sciences often forces us to rely on a pragmatic notion of truth. An adaptive logic interpreting scientific theories as pragmatically possible was already given in (Meheus, 2002). The logic presented in this paper refers to a complementary view on pragmatic truth: not with respect to theories but with respect to single statements, facts or data. Therefore we rely on Nicholas Reschers concept of presumptive truth and the connected cognitive action called (presumptive) taking presented in (Rescher, 2001), and present an adaptive logic modelling the local acceptance and rejection of a statement.