

Fighting discourses
The construction of the self and the enemy

Media covering war
Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Kosovo

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Hegemony at war

When a nation or a people goes to war, powerful mechanisms come into play, in order to turn an adversary into the enemy. Where the existence of an adversary is considered legitimate and the right to defend their - distinct - ideas is not questioned, an enemy is excluded from the political community and has to be destroyed (Mouffe 1997: 4). The transformation of an adversary into an enemy is supported by a set of discourses, articulating the identities of all parties involved. These discourses play a crucial role, as Keen has put it:

'In the beginning we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the image. We think others to death and then invent the battle-axe or the ballistic missiles with which to actually kill them' (Keen 1986: 10).

Discourses on the enemy are based on a series of elementary dichotomies¹, such as good/evil, just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational and civilised/uncivilised, which can be defined as floating (or empty) signifiers (Laclau 1985: 112-113; Žižek 1989: 97). These floating signifiers have no fixed meaning, but they are (re)articulated before, during and after the conflict and placed in a chain of equivalence. Both sides claim to be rational and civilised, and to fight a good and just war, attributing responsibility for the conflict to the enemy. The construction of the enemy is accompanied by the construction of the identity of the self, clearly in an antagonistic relationship to the enemy's identity. In this process not only the radical otherness of the enemy is emphasised, but the enemy is also considered to be a threat to 'our own' identity. In this fashion the enemy's identity becomes a constitutive outside (Laclau 1990: 17), supporting the identity construction of the self.

Especially in wartime little room is left for internal differences, which is evidenced by the words of the German Emperor Wilhelm, who during the First World War claimed that *'he would no longer hear of different political parties, only of Germans'* (Torfing 1999: 126). The discourses on the enemy (and on the self) tend to become very quickly hegemonic, defining the horizon of our thought and excluding other discourses. Used in a Gramscian sense, hegemony here refers to the *'articulation of a plurality of identities into collective wills capable of constituting a certain social order'* (Torfing 1999: 103).

Hegemony is thus the ability to fix meaning, within a specific context of space and time, taking into account the constant struggle of different groups and social forces *'in order to control the direction, policies and future of the society'* (Kellner 1992: 58). A successful hegemonic project succeeds in making its logic and rules accepted as the natural logic and rules of the community. In order to become hegemonic it also has to contribute to the deactivation (or 'forgetting') of other related discourses it was struggling against (Sayyid 1998: 262), which in wartime means the deactivation of the discourses the enemy produces, the discourses on peace and other critical or counter-hegemonic discourses. But as a hegemonic project will never manage to reach full discursive closure (Laclau 1985: 112-113), this deactivation will never be complete.

Although the discourses that constitute the construction of the enemy are widespread specific groups of actors tend to play a vital role in the hegemonisation of those discourses. These

¹ These dichotomies can also be referred to as nodal points (Lacan and Laclau & Mouffe) or binary oppositions (Derrida).

groups can benefit from unequal power relations that increase the weight of their statements. A first group of actors is usually referred to as the state, unifying among others governments, parliaments, political parties, advisory bodies and not in the least the military. Not only does a state hold decision-making powers, has to assume responsibility for waging war and will be held accountable for the course of war, but as a political organ - representing and governing 'the people' - its statements (and actions) can play a vital role in establishing or supporting an hegemonic process. As war is considered a very specific condition - which threatens the existence of numerous human beings and possibly 'even' the survival of the state itself - not only the legitimisation of war is considered appropriate. The support of the home front (or national unity) and a military victory become prime political objectives, legitimising a policy of hegemonisation.

From this point of view, propaganda could be seen as one of the available (and widely used) instruments for the purpose of hegemonisation. The specific characteristic of propaganda is its emphasis on an a priori planning by organised groups, which can range from a small number of special advisors to large bureaucratic organisations responsible for the propaganda and counter-propaganda efforts (Jowett 1997: 75). Propaganda or the selective process of information dissemination is supplemented by censorship or the withholding of information (Taylor 1995: 10), which can be considered a second instrument for hegemonisation.

It should be noted that hegemonic practices are much broader than any propaganda activity. Most authors stress that propaganda is a deliberate persuasive communication process, which is often highly organised (see for instance (Taylor 1995: 6; Jowett 1997: 75)). Propaganda should therefore not be confused with ideology. That latter is not necessarily meant to be persuasive, although it equally holds a truth-claim. Reducing every ideological statement to a mere persuasive act would imply a very pessimistic approach to ideology and to politics in general, which would result in a very rationalistic and deterministic view to human behaviour.

Hegemony, on the contrary, clearly incorporates the process of negotiation and the creation of consent. Although propaganda might serve as an instrument to enhance political and societal consensus, the construction of the enemy, supported by the good/evil, just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational and civilised/uncivilised dichotomies, is a process that starts before the decision to engage in the dissemination of propaganda. The different political actors, supported by their respective ideological frames, will engage in a negotiation, which in some cases will result in the actual construction of an enemy and eventually in the collective will to fight a war.

The media: victims of a propaganda strategy?

The media - as Kellner remarks - should not be defined as hypodermic needles, but as he calls it: '*a crucial site of hegemony*', they are not '*imposing a one-dimensional, dominant, shared set of ideas, which are then absorbed by a passive public. [...] Hegemony is constructed when a coalition of social groups imposes its agenda on the public and it attains dominance. Since most people get their ideas and opinions through the mainstream media it is a crucial site of hegemony*' (Kellner 1992: 57-58).

At the same time should media in most Western democracies be considered relatively independent organisations, with specific objectives and specific values. Even in the most

liberal normative theories of the media, news media - who play a vital role during a conflict - claim to inform their audiences and to subject the state to public scrutiny (hence the 'watchdog' role or the news media as a fourth estate). The main value supporting the construction of news media and their journalists as '*authorised truth-teller*' or '*licensed relayer of facts*' (McNair 1998, p. 65), is objectivity. As McNair puts it: '*[objectivity] is the key legitimating liberal journalism; it is a guarantee of quality control which asks us to believe that what is being said is valid and believable*' (McNair 1998, p. 65)

The application of the procedures in order to guarantee objectivity, based on the pursuit of factuality and impartiality (Westerstahl 1983), are not free from so-called economic, political, military, technological and structural bias. These biases can result from '*economic or political purposes, as when news organisations suppress damaging information about corporations to which they belong*' (Lichtenberg 1996:240). This category also partially covers propaganda and censorship, when military or political strategies attempt to limit access to available information or to specific spaces (such as battle grounds). In other cases the biases result from technological features, as for instance is the case of television's reliance on 'good pictures', which are not always easy to obtain during a conflict.

Thirdly, and in our opinion most importantly, bias can be structural and related to the professional news values (including the strive for objectivity itself). The demand for factuality and source credibility - combined with the time pressure imposed by the news production process, creating a need for easy and quick access to those sources - favours what McNair calls '*establishment sources*' (McNair 1998: 76-77). In this way, the professional ethics guarantee elite access to the news, because '*journalists have to interview legitimate elites on all major sides of a dispute*' (Entman 1989: 37). Especially when different (opposing) political parties and actors are in agreement, hegemonic policies or ideas are strengthened (Kellner 1992: 61). The emphasis on elite opinions also tends to exclude members of (for instance) the peace movement from the mainstream media, while those social groups actually attempt to offer a counter-hegemonic discourse.

But bias cannot - in our opinion - solely account for the intensification of the discourses on the enemy. The main argument here is that journalists and media organisations are not situated outside discourse, and will influence and be influenced by the discourses which circulate at a given time and space in society. In traditional communication theory this 'influence of the media' is generally referred to as the agenda-setting role of the media, which could also be re-interpreted as media-organisations entering the discursive negotiation which will eventually result in the actual construction of an enemy. Before the political decision to engage in warfare is made, the media have already offered a series of representations of the future enemy, thus influencing the political agenda. Offering these representations will at the same time partially fix future representations of the future enemy and the future media agenda. When confronted with the hegemonic strategies of the state, the media will still play a role in the actual shaping of hegemony, distributing and intensifying discourses on the enemy and the self. At the same time they are confronted with discourses constructed during a negotiation in which the media played an important role; which renders these discourses very tempting and difficult to ignore.

Fragmented genealogies

Vietnam: the failure of a hegemonic project

The dichotomies good/evil, just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational and civilised/uncivilised - in order to construct the enemy and the self - were prominently present in the Vietnam War, although this hegemonic project eventually failed. In the Vietnam War the enemy was demonised by articulating the South Vietnamese insurrection with communist aggression. The US demonised North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF or Vietcong) and constructed them as a threat to the 'free world' by referring to the domino theory. This theory, already embraced by Kennedy in 1956, presupposed that if Vietnam fell to communism, so would Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia (Vertzberger 1998: 268-269). The guerrilla tactics of the NLF (translated by the US as terrorism and combined with atrocity stories (Hallin 1986: 158)) also led to a specific type of conflict, where there were no fixed lines of battle, and large military engagements were the exception. The NLF often fought by night and was not easily identifiable from the rest of the population (Williams 1987: 217), which led to a rather ambiguous articulation of the Vietnamese people in this conflict: while the death of communist South Vietnamese civilians was considered just, the death of 'good' civilians was regretted but considered unavoidable.

Combined with the communist ideology of North Vietnam and the NLF, the guerrilla warfare also facilitated the dehumanisation of the NVA/NLF soldier. As Hallin argues, this discourse hardly changed over the course of the war (Hallin 1986: 149): they were '*fanatical*', '*suicidal*', '*savage*', '*halfcrazed*'. *They were lower than mere criminals (there is usually some 'human interest' angle in crime reporting): they were vermin. Television reports routinely referred to areas controlled by the NLF as 'communist infested' or 'Vietcong infested'*" (Hallin 1986: 158).

These images of the enemy soldiers contrast strongly with the emphasis on the professionalism, manliness and heroism of the US-soldier, which was combined with admiration for the technology being used. In its turn this technology was a combination of the '*escalation of more traditional firepower*' (Gerbner 1992: 255) and new developments, as for instance attack helicopters (the 'Cobra') and laser-guided missiles (the 'Paveway'). Media reports on new technology often stressed the skills of the men using them, and especially pilots were allotted for the role of '*heroes of technology*' (Hallin 1986: 50). With the Tet Offensive, the US hegemonic project ended, but as Hallin has argued, the discourse on the US involvement was not disarticulated with the dichotomies on good/evil and just/unjust, only the '*conviction that the forces of good would inevitably prevail*' (Hallin 1986: 158) changed. After Tet the image of the US soldier also changed, with an increased emphasis on the cost of the war, but without completely neglecting the old hero image of the troops.

Persian Gulf and the success of hegemony

The Persian Gulf War has been a culminating point in the military-media relations, leading to an unprecedented wave of studies and debates on the issue (see for instance (Kellner 1992; Mowlana 1992; Baudrillard 1995; Cheney 1997)). The literature stresses the military monopoly over information and the media's Gulf War Syndrome. Pooling, media blackout systems and other selective information techniques led to a uniformed flow of information and

disinformation. Again, the military information management served to support the discourses on the enemy and on the self, constructing the good/evil, just/unjust and other dichotomies. Aksoy and Robins capture the identity of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War as *'the evil empire'* (Aksoy 1992: 202). The demonisation (and hence the construction) of the enemy was articulated in different ways. First its leader, Saddam Hussein, using the state-as-person metaphor (Cheney 1997: 71), was identified as a tyrant, who suppressed its people violently and had to be considered a threat to the democratic world and the 'New World Order' (Collon 1992: 57; Taylor 1998: 5). The demonisation of Iraqi leadership is well illustrated by the cover of the 'The New Republic', where the moustache of Saddam Hussein was altered in order to increase the resemblance with Adolf Hitler, a commonly used metaphor (Collon 1992: 61). Secondly the difference between the political leadership and the military on the one hand, and the Iraqi 'people' on the other hand was emphasised. As US-general Schwarzkopf said: *'We have said all along that this is not a war against the Iraqi people'* (Quoted in (Taylor 1998: 170)). Consequently, the US appealed to the Iraqi people to overthrow their ruler and restore democracy in Iraq.

The military were demonised as well: they were considered the fourth largest standing army in the world (Laurent 1991: 142-143; Collon 1992: 100), ready to engage in chemical warfare (Kellner 1992: 66-67). These reports were supported by traditional atrocity propaganda, which was afterwards only partially confirmed (Taylor 1998: 226). The demonisation of the military was combined with its dehumanisation, or the *'disembodying [of] actual bodies and images of bodies'*, as Dyson calls it (Dyson 1995: 35). Iraqi soldiers were seen as part of military technology, semi-machines who played a role keeping the wheels of the military going. The pictures of cameras in the nosecones of the 'smart' bombs showed the targets coming into view, followed by an explosion and video snow. The death and destruction that followed afterwards could not be shown, as the camera was destroyed as well (Hiebert 1997: 33-34). These images have made the Persian Gulf War, as many have argued, the first virtual war, a TV-simulation of reality (Baudrillard 1995).

The dehumanisation of the enemy soldiers is opposed to the images of the professional, manly and heroic allied soldiers, who are fighting a war to liberate Kuwait and protect world peace. Yet again, pilots spearheaded the construction of heroes, supported by the emphasis on 'good', 'efficient' and 'clean' technology. Stealth weapons and sea-launched cruise missiles were, combined with Strategic Defence Initiative-like (SDI) defences and space systems. The images of this weaponry were accompanied by an euphoric belief in their performance and perfection. The presence of experts in the media, speaking in technical rather than in political or in moral terms (Hallin 1994: 55), further shifted the central question from 'is it right?' to 'does it work?' (Cheney 1997: 69). Through this emphasis on technology, which almost became human - being smart is a human capacity - not only the impression of a clean war without victims was created, but also the rationality and the civilisation of the allies were propagated, as the West was capable of 'surgical strikes', minimising human suffering.

Kosovo and another success of hegemony?

When analysing the NATO press conferences², the traditional dichotomies good/evil, just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational and civilised/uncivilised were widely used

² These transcripts can be found on the NATO website, in the web-archive of the NATOPRES mailing list, located at <http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/archives/natopres.html>. For the period from March to June, 245

during the Kosovo-conflict. The discourse on the FRY was strongly articulated with the violation of the human rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo during what can only be described as a civil war between FRY army and police forces and the KLA³, a guerrilla movement. The UK Prime Minister Blair for instance, accused the FRY of a politics of genocide: *'As well as taking pride in its peacekeeping part, NATO can be proud of its fighting role today. We cannot and we will not stand by and allow a policy of genocide to succeed. Reversing the hideous policy of ethnic cleansing is the best anniversary memorial NATO could have'* (23 April 1999, at a commemorative ceremony of the 50th anniversary of NATO). The human rights' violations became articulated not only with a lack of humanity, but also with a lack of civilisation, as the speech of the Italian prime minister D'Alema at a NATO press conference illustrated: *'We have used force as a means to an end, to attain a victory that is not the victory of NATO, but first and foremost the victory of those hundreds of thousands of people who have been expelled from their homes, from their homeland, by a regime which has trodden upon any principle of civilisation and humanity'* (20 May, 1999, NATO press conference).

In the same way as during the Persian Gulf War, the state-as-person metaphor was frequently used, making the FRY president, Slobodan Milosevic, a dictator⁴ individually responsible for the human rights' violations, the repression of the people of Kosovo and *'barbaric methods of terrorising the civilian population'*. (Shea, 12 May 1999, NATO press conference). The remarks of the US president Clinton in his short speech at a North Atlantic Council meeting on 23 April, illustrated this very well: *'Mr. Milosevic forces burn and loot homes and murder innocent people. [...] Mr. Milosevic fans the flames of anger between nations and people of many faiths and ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds. Mr. Milosevic knows only one way to achieve his aims - through force'* (23 April 1999, at a NAC meeting).

In the discourse on the enemy, atrocity stories received wide attention and the victimisation of the Albanian people further supported the demonisation of the FRY. NATO for instance repeatedly made satellite pictures of supposed⁵ mass graves available to the press, which were complemented by testimonies of Albanian witnesses. At NATO press conferences, references to massacres carried out by FRY forces (as in the instance below) were frequently made: *'[...] we are not going to give up now, no way, things have gone too far. We have seen too many atrocities, too many massacres, too many rapes, too many suffering people to do that. We have an obligation to the Kosovar Albanians and we are going to keep that obligation'* (Shea, 12 May 1999, NATO press conference). The atrocity stories were further complemented by stories on personal tragedies, such as the deaths of Agani and Haxhiu, announced by NATO on 29 March and refuted a week later: *'Reliable sources report that Fehmi Agani, a member of the Kosova Albanian Delegation at Rambouillet, principle Rugova advisor and peace*

postings were downloaded. Special attention was given to the postings containing statements of Solana, Blair, Clinton, Aznar, D'Alema and Schröder.

³ The discourses on the KLA and from the KLA are not incorporated in this analysis.

⁴ On one occasion Shea gives during one of the press conferences a brief overview of Serbia's 20th century political history, not only referring to Milosevic as a dictator, but implicitly suggesting the Serbian people should rise against him: *'Serbia is a country which throughout its history has had some bitter and tragic experiences standing up to external dictatorships. It did this heroically in 1915 and then again during the dark days of the Second World War. The problem of course for the Serb people today is not to vanquish an external dictatorship, but an internal dictatorship.'* (28 April, NATO press conference)

⁵ Again the first signs of possible atrocity propaganda - in this case exaggerating the number of Albanian casualties in Kosovo as a result of the Serbian 'genocide' - are showing. See for instance the Stratfor.com article: *'Where Are Kosovo's Killing Fields?'* (Stratfor.com 1999)

negotiator over much of the past year, was executed on Sunday sometime after he attended the funeral of Bajram Kelmendi. Four other prominent ethnic Albanians were reportedly executed on Sunday, including Editor-in-Chief of Koha Ditore, Baton Haxhiu' (Air Commodore Wilby, 29 March 1999, NATO press conference). The emphasis on the atrocities of FRY forces contrasts with the absence of the soldiers of the FRY in the discourses on the enemy, dehumanising them by reducing them to military technology. Their deaths were implicitly considered 'good', but were rarely mentioned and their bodies were almost never visible.

The images of cameras mounted on 'smart' bombs or on fighter planes rarely showed Serbian troops, but tended to focus on military material (tanks and other vehicles) and on infrastructure. During the daily press conferences, the NATO spokesman listed the successes of the previous bombing raids by referring to the destruction of infrastructure without mentioning the loss of life among the FRY troops. When the NATO spokesman did refer to the Serb soldiers, a neutral word (like 'unit') was used: *'As you know, we have hit a number of tanks and artillery and units already [...]*' (Shea, 14 April 1999, NATO press conference).

This verbal dehumanisation and disembodiment of Serb soldiers was strongly opposed to the way 'their victims' were described: instead of using euphemisms the victims were counted, and referred to as 'humans' who have 'bodies': *'[...] we've had reports of people being killed returning from the border with the former Republic of Macedonia at a village called Dogavanic (phon), we have heard of 15 villages having been burned since 10 April, looting in Maleveso on 10 April exactly and reports of mass graves at Gladnic (phon) - 24 bodies - Lapastica (phon) - 30 - and Pristina 100'* (Shea, 14 April 1999, NATO press conference, our emphasis).

In the Kosovo war, NATO also constructed a distinction between the political leadership and military at one hand and the Yugoslav civilians on the other hand. The following comment from NATO secretary-general Solana illustrated NATO's position: *'[...] I would like to stress that NATO is not at war with Yugoslavia. Our quarrel is not with the Yugoslav people but with a government and a military force that are abusing their people in violation of all accepted norms of human rights'* (12 April 1999, NATO press conference). The bombing of targets in the Yugoslav cities, and the air-to-ground attacks in Kosovo unavoidably increased the risk of civilian casualties, while NATO continued to stress their intention to avoid 'innocent victims'. Aznar, the Spanish prime minister for instance declared: *'I do share the concern to have as few victims as possible and certainly not as consequences of acts by the Atlantic Alliance and I do share this concern not to have victims through actions by the Serb military forces and Milosevic. So we share this concern to avoid victims and we would like human rights to be respected as much as possible'* (25 May 1999, NATO press conference). 'Collateral damage' as it was euphemistically called had to be avoided, but when it did occur, as was the case when two refugee convoys on the Prizren/Dakovica and Dacani/Dakovica roads were bombed on 14 April, the responsibility lied with Milosevic: *'Of course we have been always extremely careful in avoiding collateral damage and in avoiding casualties among the civilian population. Nevertheless, General Milosevic must know that doing so, if he does so, he endangers the lives of his citizens'* (General Marani, 14 April 1999, NATO press conference). Another strategy the NATO spokesmen applied was referring to the NATO cause and the impossibility to avoid the loss of innocent life to achieve that cause: *'So let us not allow one accident, no matter how tragic, to obscure the real stakes in this crisis, which is that sometimes one has to risk the lives of the few in order to save the lives of the many'* (Shea, 15 April 1999, NATO press conference).

Constructing NATO

In opposition to the construction of the enemy, the discourse on NATO was articulated with the protection of human rights, justice, civilisation and democracy. In the Kosovo Crisis several public announcements of the start of the military action were made by NATO and the allied nations, but the most important one was made by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who announced the decision for bombardments in a symbolically midnight press conference on 23 March at 11.20 p.m., claiming that *'no alternative [was] open but to take military action'*. The motive for action dealt with the need to *'halt the violence, [to] bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe, [and to] stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century'* (23 March, NATO press conference). Almost a month later, at a joint press conference of Solana and Blair on 20 April, Solana ended the introduction of his guest (UK prime minister Blair) in the following way: *'Let me just finish by saying that this is all part of a collective international effort to bring stability, to bring justice, to the Balkans. NATO has spent the past 50 years defending the values of democracy, human rights, liberty and the rule of law. It will continue to do so'* (20 April 1999, NATO press conference). A few moments later Blair explained the journalists attending the press conference (and eventually their audiences of course) that the demands of NATO were just and reasonable (again articulating the NATO discourse with justice, rationality and civilisation): *'He [Milosevic] has got to yield to the NATO demands that are being met because those demands are right and are reasonable and are the minimum demands that humanity and civilisation can make of him. And he has to know, and get the message, that our will on this is undivided and total, and it is'* (20 April 1999, NATO press conference).

When NATO reacted to the refugee crisis by setting up the 'Allied Harbour' operation, deploying a force of NATO troops in Albania to help with humanitarian relief, the contrast with the discourse on the enemy was even deepened more. Not only was NATO constructed as an organisation fighting for the protection of human rights, but they were now also seen as actively helping and *'taking care of Milosevic's victims, the refugees'* (Solana, 20 April, NATO press conference). In this fashion 'Allied Harbour' demilitarised (a part of) NATO, further adding weight to the articulation of NATO as an organisation who cared about human rights and civilisation.

The discourse on NATO soldiers contained the same duality. NATO forces engaged in the 'Allied Harbour' operation were seen giving relief aid to people in need. They ceased to be soldiers as they were articulated as semi-civilians, saving life instead of taking life. Traditionally, the NATO pilots were seen as heroes, mastering the newest technologies and risking their lives for the Albanian Kosovars. A more poetic depiction of these *'heroes of technology'* - as Hallin has called them (Hallin 1986: 50) - came from Zymberi, a guest speaker at the NATO press conference of 24 May who was a bit vaguely introduced by the NATO spokesperson Daniel as being someone *'from the Kosovo Information Centre in London'*: *'The Albanians of Kosovo applaud the brave NATO military personnel, they are aware that those angels of our skies risk their lives day and night in order to bring peace to a long-suffering people. These pilots will remain our heroes of peace forever'* (Zymberi, 24 May, NATO press conference). Earlier Shea defended the pilot who accidentally bombed the refugee convoy on the Prizren/Dakovica road in the following way: *'why was a NATO pilot 15,000 feet up in the air yesterday afternoon over Kosovo? Because along with about 1,000*

other NATO pilots, he was risking his life every day to stop human suffering in Kosovo and to allow these 580,000 refugees to be able to go back home' (Shea, 15 April, NATO press conference).

Finally technology was yet again perceived as being good and smart. The same images made through cameras in the nosecones of smart bombs or in fighter planes were being televised, propagating the rationality of war and the civilised way of waging it. The use of these images rendered the war clean, as no victims were shown and as these weapons were said to minimise the damage: *'The versatility of these aircraft allows us to use a type of weapon that provides maximum effectiveness against a target and minimise damage to civilians and to civilian property. Our arsenal ranges from guns to precision guided weapons and munitions, and to specialised weapons employing the very latest technology'* (Shea, 6 May, NATO press conference). The traditional euphoric belief in technology was during the Kosovo War strongly nuanced by the failure to bring the US Apache helicopters into action⁶, especially because high hopes were raised concerning the ability of the Apache helicopters to attack the FRY ground forces, and thus increase the pressure on the FRY political and military leadership to accept surrender.

Conclusion

This paper claims that in comparison to two major earlier international military conflicts, with Western involvement, the discursive construction of the enemy and the self during the 1999 Kosovo Crisis shows many similarities as well as new articulations. In the Kosovo War, FRY (the enemy) and NATO (the self) identities were successfully constructed, using the traditional good/evil, just/unjust, guilty/innocent, rational/irrational and civilised/uncivilised dichotomies, dominantly present during other 20th century conflict as the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War.

But as the contextual factors have changed in the course of the 20th century, the articulation of the discourses on the enemy and the self has evenly changed. The articulation of the enemy as an ideological (communist) enemy, supported by a long-term and continuous campaign of persuasion and information, is replaced by the personalised articulation of the enemy, using the state-as-person metaphor, based on the very simple equation: Hitler = Houssein = Milosevic. The almost complete disappearance of the fundamental ideological conflict of the (c)old world order has at the same time allowed to foreground a discourse on the protection of human rights, inherently provoking a re-articulation of the concepts of 'enemy people' and 'innocent civilians' and allowing for the construction of the self as actively involved in giving relief aid.

Where once the communist ideology, the state apparatus and their supporters were demonised as a whole, now the state is radically personalised and identified with its leader, using the state-as-person metaphor. Leadership seems to be isolated from the people's will and it is openly demonised as the source of all evil.

⁶ On 5 May Major General Jertz for instance announces the crash of an Apache helicopter during a training session, causing the death of its two crew members. (5 May, NATO Press Conference)

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